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Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010026-6

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# TRENDS

*in Communist Propaganda*

**Confidential**  
4 AUGUST 1971  
(VOL. XXII, NO. 31)

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in communist broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

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FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

## CONTENTS

Topics and Events Given Major Attention . . . . . i

### INDOCHINA

NHAN DAN Attacks on U.S., Giap Remarks Show Pique at PRC . . . . . 1  
Peking Seeks to Allay Anxieties of Indochinese Allies . . . . . 5  
USSR Says Sino-U.S. Developments Help U.S. Avoid Reply to PRG . . . . . 8  
DRV, PRG Press for "Positive" U.S. Response to Peace Plan . . . . . 10  
Le Duc Tho Visits Moscow, Peking En Route to Hanoi from Paris . . . . . 12  
DRV Statement Marks Lao Anniversary; PRC Supports NLHS Plan . . . . . 13  
Hanoi Evaluates Military Developments in First Half of 1971 . . . . . 15

### CHINA

Peking Propounds "Revolutionary Diplomatic Line" on Army Day . . . . . 18  
Editorial Seems to Downgrade Lin While Stressing CCP Control . . . . . 23  
Politburo Members Present at Reception Listed by Rank . . . . . 24

### SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS

Bloc Leaders, Minus Ceausescu, Stress Unity at Crimea Meeting . . . . . 26  
CEMA Communique Reflects Price of "Unanimity" on Integration . . . . . 28  
Hardcore Allies Picture CEMA as Instrument of Political Unity . . . . . 29  
Hungarian Premier Stresses Continuing Contacts with West . . . . . 31  
Romania Insists CEMA Integration Will Not Affect Sovereignty . . . . . 31

### NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

PRAVDA Anticipates PRC Rejection of Five-Power Conference Bid . . . . . 34

### SUDAN

Observer Article, TASS Statement Highlight Protest Campaign . . . . . 37  
Communist Media Vary on Role of Sudan CP in 19 July Coup . . . . . 41

### GERMANY

GDR Details Offer to Senat; TASS Edits NEUES DEUTSCHLAND Item . . . . . 45

CONFIDENTIAL

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FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- i -

## TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 26 JULY - 1 AUGUST 1971

Moscow (3153 items)

Sudanese Events	(--)	15%
[TASS Statements	(--)	6%]
Indochina	(14%)	9%
[Solidarity Month	(8%)	6%]
RSFSR Supreme Soviet	(--)	6%
Session		
CEMA Session in	(--)	5%
Bucharest		
Cuban National Day	(1%)	5%
China	(4%)	5%
Lunakhod I	(1%)	3%

Peking (1332 items)

Domestic Issues	(33%)	33%
[PLA Anniversary	(--)	16%]
Indochina	(30%)	15%
[Geneva Agreements	(16%)	3%]
Anniversary		
[Sihanouk in DPRK	(7%)	3%]
Sierra Leone Finance	(0.1%)	11%
Minister in PRC		
DPRK Liberation	(--)	10%
Anniversary		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 1 -

## INDOCHINA

Expressions of Hanoi's concern over Sino-U.S. relations reached a new level of authority on the occasion of the 44th anniversary on 1 August of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Defense Minister Giap's congratulatory message to Lin Biao was superficially correct, with the usual tribute to the Chinese revolution and the "esteemed" Chairman Mao and expressions of appreciation for Chinese aid. But there were elements in the message, as well as in Giap's speech at the Chinese embassy reception, which seemed clearly to reflect North Vietnamese annoyance with China.

Hanoi also chose the 1 August anniversary to publish a lengthy NHAN DAN Commentator article on the history of "aggressive U.S. imperialism"; the article made Hanoi's first--albeit oblique--reference to steps to improve Sino-U.S. relations when it observed that "recently, the U.S. ruling circles have occasionally spoken of reassessing the China danger." And it pointedly went on to say that "the U.S. imperialists, however, can in no way conceal their sinister designs and cruel schemes against the Chinese revolution from the clear-sighted vision of progressive mankind."

Peking for the most part has ignored the polemical Hanoi comment, but it has sought to reassure the Vietnamese, as well as its Laotian and Cambodian allies, that support for them would not be diminished by the recent PRC moves to improve relations with the United States. Support for the PRG's 1 July peace proposal is reiterated on an authoritative level in a 3 August PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, pegged to a message from Sihanouk to the Khmer people in which he said Chou En-lai had reassured him that the Nixon visit would not change PRC support for Indochina.

Moscow continues to complain that the United States is delaying a reply to the PRG's seven-point proposal, with many commentators saying President Nixon's planned trip to Peking aids U.S. procrastination. They say the trip is aimed at diverting attention from the war and at making it possible for the United States to avoid a reply to the PRG proposal. Moscow's support for the PRG proposal is expressed authoritatively in the 2 August communique on the meeting in the Crimea of the leaders of "fraternal countries."

### NHAN DAN ATTACKS ON U.S., GIAP REMARKS SHOW PIQUE AT PRC

After the barrage of propaganda between 19 and 25 July, evincing DRV concern that the announcement of the President's planned visit to Peking had served to deflect attention from the 1 July

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 2 -

PRG peace initiative, the media dispensed with polemical attacks on the United States for almost a week. But on the occasion of the 44th anniversary of Peking's PLA, on 1 August, Hanoi again voiced its misgivings about Peking's flirtation with the country engaged in "imperialist aggression" in Indochina.

Defense Minister Giap's annual congratulatory message to his counterpart Lin Piao as well as his speech at an anniversary reception conveyed some of the overtones of the earlier propaganda, though in less direct fashion. At sharp variance with the substance of Giap's messages on this occasion for the past six years, almost half of the message this time was devoted to a discussion of U.S. "aggression" in Indochina in terms similar to the recent flurry of Hanoi comment assailing the Nixon Doctrine. Thus, Giap said that the United States, along with its "criminal war and preparations for new military adventures," is "resorting to all perfidious moves in the hope of getting out of its stalemate and improving its difficult situation. The Vietnamese people and armed forces always maintain a resolute stand and keep a wary eye on all the schemes and maneuvers of the enemy . . . ."

Superficially, the message was correct and some of the passages were verbatim repeats of the language of earlier years: There was the usual praise for the Chinese revolution and the "esteemed" Chairman Mao, hope for continuing fraternal friendship and militant solidarity between the two peoples, and expressions of gratitude for the great Chinese support and assistance to the Vietnamese. But in another break with the language of the six previous messages, Giap for the first time did not characterize Chinese assistance as being in the spirit of "proletarian internationalism." He was also more sparing in his use of adjectives this year, expressing "deep gratitude for the great, precious support and assistance." Last year he had cited the "wholehearted and firm support and great and effective assistance full of proletarian internationalism."

A reference to proletarian internationalism did appear in this year's message in another, seemingly pointed context. While the message concluded exactly as last year's did, "May the fraternal friendship and militant solidarity between the peoples and armies last forever!", it included a reminder in another passage that the Vietnamese "have always done their best to consolidate and strengthen [Chinese-Vietnamese] friendship on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 3 -

At the same time, the message did not repeat last year's assertion that the Vietnamese consider Chinese successes "strong stimulus for their own revolutionary cause."

It also seems significant that Giap this year paid tribute to the PRC's contribution to the worldwide struggle only in a historical context. Thus, after describing the PLA's feats on the way to the victorious Chinese revolution, he said that this victory "ushered in the era of socialism in fraternal China while dealing a very heavy blow at U.S.-led imperialism, greatly contributing to the world people's struggle for peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism." The underlined phrase appeared in last year's message in a current rather than a historical context. The 1970 message read:

Armed with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought, with its undaunted fighting spirit and splendid tradition of struggle, with the rapid progress of modern military science and technology, the PLA is now assuming the glorious task of defending the socialist construction of the Chinese people, greatly contributing to the cause of peace, national independence, democracy and socialism in the whole world.

This year's message used identical language to characterize the PLA but described its "glorious task" only as "preserving the gains of the Chinese people's revolution while taking an active part in the building of socialism with greater and greater success."

GIAP SPEECH      NCNA carried the text of Giap's congratulatory message, just as it had carried the text of the 21 July DRV Foreign Ministry statement marking the anniversary of the 1954 agreements, with its charge that the United States has "resorted to insidious tricks to sow division among the socialist countries in an attempt to pressure the Vietnamese people into accepting their conditions." However, Peking media have ignored the polemical Hanoi press comment, and in reporting Giap's speech at the Chinese embassy reception on PLA day NCNA omitted some of his remarks included in the VNA version. (A full text of Giap's speech has not been carried by VNA or Hanoi radio.)

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 4 -

As reported by VNA, Giap in his speech cited recent communist "victories of strategic significance" in Indochina as evidence of small countries' ability to defeat even U.S. "imperialist aggression," scored Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine, and said that the U.S. "imperialists" are "resorting to all cruel and cunning schemes, military as well as political, in an attempt to save themselves from their predicament." But NCNA's report deleted the reference to "cruel and cunning schemes."

NCNA duly reported Giap's reference to the "valuable support and assistance" from China, but it ignored a later passage in which he stressed Vietnamese self-reliance. As reported by VNA, he said: "Relying mainly on our own efforts and enjoying the sympathy, great support and assistance of the socialist countries and the world's peoples, we Vietnamese people more than ever before firmly believe in our invincible strength, are resolved to defeat completely the U.S. aggressors . . . ."

NHAN DAN COMMENTATOR The lengthy NHAN DAN Commentator article of 1 August, broadcast in installments by Hanoi radio on the 1st and 2d, uses the device of tracing the history of U.S. "imperialism" since the Spanish-American War to direct new jibes at Peking for its courting of the Nixon Administration. It is after a reference to the Taiwan policy of the "Eisenhower-Nixon clique" and the persistent policy of U.S. air intrusions and "provocations" against China that Commentator refers obliquely to moves to improve Sino-U.S. relations: "Recently, the U.S. ruling circles have occasionally spoken of reassessing the China danger. However, the U.S. imperialists can in no way conceal their sinister designs and cruel schemes against the Chinese revolution from the clear-sighted vision of progressive mankind."

Echoing a major theme of the polemical Hanoi propaganda beginning with the 19 July NHAN DAN editorial, Commentator then declares that a major U.S. aim is to sow disunity among the socialist countries. While in the earlier comment this aim was put in terms of the Nixon Doctrine, Commentator says that "to divide and rule has been the imperialists' traditional stratagem aimed at repressing and annihilating the revolutionary forces." And he adds bluntly:

In recent years the United States has at certain times created the impression that there were new changes in its relations with one country or another . . . . But the advanced forces leading the various revolutionary movements in the world have come to realize more and more clearly that the United States' old rigidity or new flexibility are dictated by one motive and one basic objective determined by the unchanged, aggressive nature of U.S. imperialism.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 5 -

## PEKING SEEKS TO ALLAY ANXIETIES OF INDOCHINESE ALLIES

Peking has sought to allay Vietnamese communist uneasiness at U.S.-PRC moves to improve relations by sustaining its high-level support for the 1 July PRG seven-point peace initiative and the Indochinese "struggle" against the United States. Most notable was a 3 August PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article chastising the United States for its failure to respond to the PRG seven-point proposal and seeking to take the wind out of speculation on the convening of a new Geneva conference on Indochina.

Although keyed to Sihanouk's 24th message to the Khmer nation, dated 30 July--released by Pyongyang's KCNA on 31 July and carried in virtually identical form by NCNA on 2 August--the PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article ignored the fact that Sihanouk's message was devoted to President Nixon's projected visit to Peking.\* However, by quoting selectively from Sihanouk's message, Commentator stressed his point that "the problem of Indochina can be settled only by the Indochinese peoples themselves" on the basis of a total and unconditional withdrawal of all non-Indochinese forces, leaving the Indochinese "to solve themselves the problems without outside interference." Sihanouk had prefaced this declaration with the contention that "the essential subjects of discussions" between Nixon and Chou En-lai "will probably be confined to problems directly connected with the United States and the PRC, for example that of Taiwan, an integral part of China." In fact, the essence of Sihanouk's message, and the point which Peking sought to convey to its Indochinese compatriots, was capsuled in his claim that Chou had "assured" him that the Nixon visit "would in no way bring a change to the attitude of the PRC" with respect to its support for the RGNUC, the Vietnamese communists, and the Laotian Patriotic Front.

Offering additional assurance, PEOPLE'S DAILY addressed itself to an alleged rumor concerning the convening of a new Geneva conference to seek an Indochina-wide settlement, declaring that "any plot or intrigue of U.S. imperialism that runs counter to the will and interests of the Indochinese peoples will never succeed." Citing Sihanouk's revelation of such a plot,

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\* NCNA's transmission of the Sihanouk message was Peking media's only mention of the Nixon visit since the original announcement.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 6 -

Commentator charged that the United States, while refusing "to respond" to the PRG seven-point proposal, has "instigated its Phnom Penh lackeys to spread the word that a new Geneva conference would be convened." Claiming that the 1954 Geneva agreements "have long been thoroughly sabotaged by U.S. imperialism," Commentator maintained that in the face of defeat on the Indochina battlefield the United States "is vainly trying to turn the tide and seek a way out by calling a new Geneva conference." "This can never be done," PEOPLE'S DAILY said, quoting Sihanouk's assertion that "we three Indochinese peoples are not in need of a new Geneva conference at all."

Underlining its across-the-board support for the three Indochinese peoples, Commentator stated that "the correct way" to solve "the Indochina question" is compliance with the joint declaration of the summit conference of the Indochinese peoples, Sihanouk's five-point statement, the PRG's seven-point proposal, the five-point political solution of the Lao Patriotic Front, and the new Lao initiative for a nationwide cease-fire. Peking echoed its past demand--and "the common demand of the people of the three Indochinese countries"--that the United States withdraw "from the whole of Indochina totally, unconditionally, and immediately." Sihanouk in his message had called for "the unconditional, total, and rapid withdrawal" of aggressive forces, but added "or at least the precise fixation of the date-limit for this withdrawal."

Since Peking in this Commentator article was addressing itself to the wider Indochina problem--and it was in this broader context that the denunciation of the call for a new Geneva conference was made--the demand for a total, unconditional, and immediate U.S. withdrawal from all of Indochina cannot be viewed as a hardening of Peking's line on the more limited Vietnam issue as enunciated in the 4 July and 20 July PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials. Those editorials, endorsing the 1 July PRG seven-point proposal specifically focused on point one which calls on the United States to establish a terminal date in 1971 for troop withdrawal. Commentator again declared Peking's support of the PRG's seven-point proposal.

That 1 July PRG initiative has also received sustained high-level endorsement from other Chinese quarters. In his speech at the 31 July reception marking the 44th

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 7 -

anniversary of the PLA, Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng stated Chinese "firm support" for, among other things, the PRG's seven-point proposal.\* Reporting a speech at a Hanoi meeting marking the same occasion, NCNA on 1 August cited the contention of the military attache of the PRC Embassy in Hanoi that the seven-point proposal "has opened a correct way for peaceful settlement of the Vietnam question." "But the Nixon Administration quibbled about this proposal," the attache added, while pushing Vietnamization and intensifying military operations. Similarly, a joint Algerian-PRC communique of 2 August recorded both sides' expression of "firm support" for the Indochinese peoples and their "full agreement" with the seven-point proposal, citing the essence of the first two points. Although the PEOPLE'S DAILY/LIBERATION ARMY DAILY/RED FLAG joint editorial marking the PLA's 44th anniversary did not specifically mention the PRG's initiative, it did express "resolute support" for the Indochinese peoples and contend that U.S. forces and "lackey troops" must "unconditionally withdraw from Vietnam and the whole of Indochina, lock, stock, and barrel."

BACKGROUND ON ISSUE      Peking customarily has carried the text  
OF GENEVA CONFERENCE      of past Sihanouk statements, some of  
                                 which have also included rejections  
of the notion of an international conference on Indochina, but  
it is not known to have previously commented on one of his  
"messages to the Khmer people." On its own authority, Peking  
has occasionally reacted negatively to various calls for an  
international conference on Indochina, characterizing such  
suggestions as a "fraud" or "trick" to get the Indochinese  
people to lay down their arms. In its last previous reference  
to the issue Peking reacted in this vein to President Nixon's  
call for an Indochina conference included as point two in his  
five-point proposal of 7 October 1970. An NCNA commentary on  
11 October and a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the  
13th called the conference proposal a trick and a plot to  
"strangle" the Indochinese people's struggle. A flurry of  
negative statements on the President's proposal by Sihanouk

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\* Li Hsien-nien is the only other elite-level PRC spokesman reported by Chinese media to have expressed support for the PRG proposal--at a welcoming banquet for a government delegation from Sierra Leone on 25 July.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 8 -

and his government included a 10 October statement which raised the question of Chinese participation in a conference. As in his current statement, Sihanouk said that such a conference would not succeed without Chinese participation and that the Chinese would not attend a conference also attended by the Lon Nol government.

Peking as well as Sihanouk reacted negatively to suggestions for an international conference in the wake of the March 1970 Cambodian coup--by the French cabinet on 1 April, and later by the three-nation mission of the Djakarta conference--Japan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. For example, Li Hsien-nien at a 6 June 1970 reception on the PRG anniversary dismissed efforts of the three-nation mission by saying that the United States was stepping up "political deception" by "plotting international conferences under various names."

#### USSR SAYS SINO-U.S. DEVELOPMENTS HELP U.S. AVOID REPLY TO PRG

Moscow's continued support for the PRG's peace plan is currently highlighted by the 2 August communique on the meeting held by the leaders of "fraternal countries"--Moscow's East European allies, except Romania, plus Mongolia. The communique promises continued "all-round support" of the Indochinese peoples and says that the PRG's seven points "constitute a just foundation for restoring peace and security in Southeast Asia."

Routine comment continues to complain that the United States is procrastinating on a reply to the PRG's proposal, many commentators referring to President Nixon's planned trip to Peking in this context. Commentators continue to question how it can be a "peace trip," as described by the President, since it comes at a time when aggression is continuing in Indochina. Commentators recall that the President himself said the trip was not connected to an end to the Indochina war, and they charge that the trip is aimed at diverting attention from the war and setting the stage for the 1972 election campaign. They say that the propaganda campaign raised in the United States over the trip is making it unnecessary for the President to reply to the PRG proposal,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 9 -

and several commentators cite a New York TIMES article asserting that the President's new policy toward China has sent the Paris talks back toward a stalemate.\*

Moscow criticizes Peking's Indochina policies in some Radio Peace and Progress broadcasts in Mandarin. A 1 August commentary again cites Hanoi's charge that President Nixon's policy is aimed at dividing the socialist countries and adds that Washington is making use of Peking's long-standing splittist policies and refusal to join in united action to help the Indochinese people. A 3 August commentary, which also charges that the United States is exploiting Peking's anti-Soviet, splitting policies to escalate the war, says that such escalation has been stepped up in the wake of Kissinger's visit to Peking and the invitation to President Nixon.

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\* Moscow does not mention that the article, by Tad Szulc, noted that some observers had concluded that Peking would be unable to settle the Vietnam war except on Hanoi's terms in view of Hanoi's expressed opposition to any "big power" solution to the conflict.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 10 -

## DRV, PRG PRESS FOR "POSITIVE" U.S. RESPONSE TO PEACE PLAN

Vietnamese communist propaganda on the 1 July PRG proposal is confined largely to continued pickups of world reaction hailing it as a reasonable and correct basis for achieving peace in Vietnam. The only available comment since the 25 July NHAN DAN Commentator article comes in a Liberation Radio broadcast of 31 July which scores the lack of U.S. response to the proposal and U.S. efforts to clarify its various points. The radio notes that Ambassador Bruce at the 22 July Paris session "again asked for more clarification" of the "perfectly clear" point one on troop withdrawal and prisoner release. It adds derisively that Bruce "pretends to be deaf" and tries to avoid a serious discussion by asking for more clarification.

The Vietnamese communist delegates at the 29 July Paris session again criticized the United States for its "intensification of aggression" and "negative" attitude toward the PRG proposal. They again urged a "serious" response--particularly to the two basic points on a U.S. troop withdrawal deadline and an end to U.S. backing of the Thieu administration.

Both the LPA and VNA accounts reported that PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh again assailed the United States for attempting to evade negotiations by "rehashing its worn-out proposal for a 'cease-fire in place'" which, she said, is aimed at legalizing both U.S. occupation of South Vietnam and the "puppet administration." (The accounts do not reflect the fact that Mme. Binh's brief remarks on the U.S. call for a cease-fire were prompted by Ambassador Bruce's statement at the 22 July session. The Vietnamese communist post-session press briefings--which, as usual, go unreported in the media--indicate that both Mae. Binh and DRV delegate Xuan Thuy in the rebuttal period recalled that the cease-fire proposal had been previously rejected.)

The VNA account reports Xuan Thuy's charge that the Administration's "continued refusal to set" a withdrawal date in 1971 after the PRG's offer on prisoner release proves that it has been using the prisoners to hide its real intention of prolonging the war and continuing to impose the Thieu regime on the South Vietnamese people. VNA does not report that Thuy cited recent remarks by President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Laird on continuing Vietnamization and aid as evidence of U.S. intent to continue the war. Xuan Thuy at the 22 July session and the Commentator article of the 25th had deplored the Administration's "hypocrisy" on the POW issue.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 11 -

Liberation Radio has continued to broadcast purported statements by U.S. prisoners commenting on the PRG's proposal, and Hanoi joined in with a 2 August English-language broadcast of a message from two U.S. prisoners in the North. Addressed to Congress "via Representative McCloskey and Senator McGovern," the message briefly notes point one of the PRG proposal and urges that a date for troop withdrawal "be set by legislative act" to end the war so that Vietnam "will then be free to settle its own internal affairs."

**BRUCE STATEMENT** Regarding Ambassador Bruce's statement at the session on the 29th, VNA charges that he "kept evading a response to the seven-point peace plan set forth" by Mme. Binh a month ago and that he "slandered the DRV in a bid to justify the U.S. continued acts against the DRV\* and intensified acts of aggression against South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia." Thus VNA obscures his specific charge of heightened DRV military activity in the demilitarized zone (DMZ), particularly the building of a road through the western part of the DMZ joining roads in North Vietnam with those in the South. VNA says Ministers Thuy and Binh "laid bare the obstinate, negative, and slanderous allegations of the United States." It dismisses Ambassador Lam's prepared statement in one sentence: "For his part, the representative of the Saigon puppet administration only rehashed Nguyen Van Thieu's bellicose claims."

Vietnamese communist media have not mentioned that the 29 July session marked Ambassador Bruce's last appearance as head of the U.S. delegation and that he will be succeeded by Ambassador Porter on a date yet to be announced. (The communist spokesmen at the post-session briefing, responding to questions about Bruce's resignation, took the tack that the important thing is the President's policy.)

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\* North Vietnam to date has not protested the acknowledged U.S. activity against the North on 29 and 30 July, although Hanoi did claim that an unmanned U.S. reconnaissance plane was downed on 31 July over Quang Binh Province, bringing the DRV's tally of downed U.S. aircraft to 3,396.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

PDIS TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 1.2 -

## LE DUC THO VISITS MOSCOW, PEKING EN ROUTE TO HANOI FROM PARIS

Le Duc Tho's departure from Paris on 28 July--after a five-week stay dating from 24 June--was reported promptly by Hanoi the following day. VNA and Hanoi radio reported his arrival back in Hanoi on 2 August, noting that he was accompanied by Nguyen Minh Vy, deputy head of the DRV delegation to the Paris talks.\* Also on the 2d, Hanoi mentioned his stopovers in both Moscow and Peking.

**STOPOVER IN MOSCOW** In Moscow from 28 to 30 July, Le Duc Tho met with Politburo member Kirilenko for "warm and cordial" talks. According to both Moscow and Hanoi media, they discussed the further strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the two countries and the "development of the situation" in Indochina. The Soviet side expressed support for the PRG's seven-point peace proposal and promised to continue to do "everything necessary" to help the Vietnamese people's cause. Le Duc Tho emphasized Vietnamese determination to fight until victory and expressed gratitude for the USSR's "constant assistance and support."

TASS had reported on 22 June that Le Duc Tho met with both Kirilenko and Katushev while in Moscow en route to Paris after attending the East German party congress, but did not indicate the substance of their talks. Hanoi media never mentioned Tho's brief stopover in Moscow in June; VNA merely noted on 24 June that Le Duc Tho had left for Paris that day after attending the East German congress, obscuring the fact that his departure was from Moscow.

Le Duc Tho had also stopped in Moscow on his last previous trip to Paris, for the French Communist Party congress in January 1970, but there were no reports that he met any Soviet leaders. On his way home in April that year he attended the Lenin centenary celebrations in Moscow. He met with Kosygin and once with Mazurov during a number of his earlier trips in 1968 and 1969.

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIO TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 13 -

**STOPOVER** During his stopover in Peking from 31 July to  
**IN PEKING** 2 August, Le Duc Tho held talks with Chou En-lai in what NCNA described as "a warm atmosphere" and had "a cordial and friendly conversation" with Samdech Penn Nouth, prime minister of Sihanouk's RGNUC. The subjects covered were not reported. Following the talks, Chou hosted a banquet in Le Duc Tho's honor on 1 August. The 31 July NCNA report of his arrival in Peking stated that he was on his way home "from Paris," with no mention of a stopover in Moscow. Both his arrival and departure, on 2 August, were attended by a high-level Chinese delegation headed by Li Hsien-nien and including Keng Piao, Li Chiang, Fang I, Han Nien-lung, and Lu Wei-chao.

On his last visit to Peking, 9-11 June en route to the SED congress, Le Duc Tho held talks with Huang Yung-sheng, Politburo member and PLA chief of general staff, and was honored at a banquet hosted by Huang. Those talks were reported by NCNA on 10 June to have proceeded "in a most cordial and friendly atmosphere," a more effusive characterization than that of the 1 August talks with Chou. Le Duc Tho was not reported to have met with Chou during his June stopover, although on 13 June, two days after his departure, Chou met with Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi, who was returning from the Mongolian party congress.

#### DRV STATEMENT MARKS LAO ANNIVERSARY; PRC SUPPORTS NLHS PLAN

The customary DRV Foreign Ministry statement marking the ninth anniversary of the signing of the Geneva agreements on Laos (23 July) was not released until 1 August, three days later than last year's. A PRG Foreign Ministry statement was released on 29 July.\* Both statements reiterate support for the NLHS' 22 June proposal which called for a cease-fire throughout Laos "including" a cessation of U.S. bombing, to be followed by talks between the "parties concerned" in Laos. The DRV statement echoes the earlier NHAN DAN editorial on the anniversary, scoring the United States and its Vientiane "stooges" for having "rejected" the proposal and for mustering Vientiane "rightist," Vang Pao, and Thai troops to launch a big operation in the Plain of Jars-Xieng Khouang region.

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\* See the 28 July TRENDS, pages 14-15, for a discussion of initial propaganda on the anniversary.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 14 -

NCNA duly carried the full text of the DRV statement, but Peking, consistent with its usual low-key treatment, has not commented on the anniversary. Peking did, however, voice its first official endorsement of the NLHS' 22 June peace initiative: Huang Yung-sheng, in a 31 July PLA anniversary speech, praised the NLHS five-point program and its "new proposal for a nationwide cease-fire." The 3 August PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on Sihanouk's statement repeats the formulation in the course of its reassurance of Chinese support for all the Indochinese peoples. Peking had previously limited itself to reportage of foreign comment on the initiative.

TASS briefly reported the Vietnamese statements on the Geneva agreements anniversary but offers no comment of its own.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 15 -

## HANOI EVALUATES MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN FIRST HALF OF 1971

A flurry of recent Hanoi commentaries, using the device of a review of the Indochina fighting during the first six months of the year, reiterates conclusions stated earlier on the basis of "strategic victories" achieved during Operation Lam Son 719. It is standard DRV practice to review military accomplishments biannually, but there seems this time to be an unusual concentration of authoritative propaganda similar to that in mid-1970 in the wake of the incursion into Cambodia. The current propaganda includes a 14 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, an article by "Chien Thang" (The Victor) published in the 2 August issues of both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, and an article by "Truc Chien" (Combat Alert) published in installments in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN at the end of July. In addition, there is an unusual, if not unique, Hanoi radio series of panel discussions on the war featuring editors from the radio and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, broadcast in the domestic service from 26 July through 3 August.

As earlier propaganda had done, the current comment indicates that the communists regard 1971 and 1972 as crucial years in defeating Vietnamization and turning the tide in their favor. Some of the comment again presses the notion that main force action is necessary to radically change the development of the war, thus raising the possibility that communist offensive action will be stepped up.

1971-72 TEST OF VIETNAMIZATION      Alleged communist military achievements in the first half of the year are hailed in the Hanoi commentaries as the greatest victories since the Tet offensive of early 1968. Just as the Tet offensive has been portrayed as the blow which persuaded the United States to change to a "defensive strategy" and stop the bombing of the North, so military achievements this year are said to be significant steps in forcing President Nixon to abandon Vietnamization and the "prolongation" of the war. The 14 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, for example, echoing comment during the campaign against Operation Lam Son 719,\*

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\* A 22 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article attributed to the military commentator Chien Binh (Combatant) claimed that the allied "defeat" in Laos was a blow at the Nixon Administration's will and, warning of "catastrophes" in the future, said that the President "cannot refuse to change his strategy." (See the 31 March TRENDS, page 4.)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 16 -

claimed that "strategically significant victories" in the past six months "constitute a strong blow at the Nixon clique's aggressive will . . . , forcing it to re-examine its Vietnamization policy."

Underlining the importance of 1971 and 1972, Hanoi propagandists maintain that the allies were forced to launch major operations in Laos and Cambodia in hopes of stabilizing the situation in South Vietnam prior to the GVN elections this year and the U.S. presidential election next year. A participant in the series of radio panel discussions typically remarked that 1971 was the "key year" for U.S. strategic policies. He went on to note the timing of the elections in South Vietnam and the United States, commenting that President Nixon's plans to stabilize the situation have failed and that the Americans have therefore encountered "great political difficulties" as well as difficulties on the battlefield.

Propaganda during Lam Son 719 in February and March this year also repeatedly made the point that the ARVN offensives in Laos and Cambodia were part of an allied effort to prevent major communist attacks during the 1971-72 election years. In addition, an article by Ha Van in the March-April issue of the Hanoi journal TUYEN HUAN (Propaganda and Training) speculated that the prospects for the coming 1971-72 dry season were "increasingly desperate" for the allies in view of the timing of the U.S. presidential election campaign and the disadvantageous change in the balance of forces which will result from a continuing withdrawal of U.S. troops.

#### THE ROLE OF MAIN FORCES

Some of the current comment again stresses the importance of main force unit action. The Chien Thang article claimed that an "outstanding feature" of the situation in the last six months was the fact that "liberation main force units . . . annihilated the enemy's big army corps while they were being deployed in large-scale combat formations." He went on to note the impact of offensives by main force units and their unique role in fighting "big battles of annihilation" as well as in striking at the enemy's strongest forces and "thereby definitely weakening him." The offensive blows of main forces, according to Chien Thang, "contribute toward upsetting and confusing enemy strategies, rapidly changing the balance of forces and the situation on the battlefield, and creating a radical development in the war."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 17 -

In a similar vein, a panelist in the radio discussion on the 27th cryptically hailed the "victories" in Laos as "opening a new era for fighting annihilating battles." On the 29th a panelist emphasized that the "revolutionary forces" were "in their best shape ever" and noted pointedly that, having defeated **an enemy**, if your forces remain in good shape you can "continue to step up the offensive tempo and attack the enemy again when the latter is panic-stricken and on the verge of collapse."

Both the 14 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial and a panelist in the final discussion program maintained that "victories" this year have "opened prospects" for defeating the allies "militarily." The claim that military victory can be achieved, implicitly raising the possibility of stepped-up fighting to obtain that end, had not often appeared in Hanoi propaganda in recent years prior to Lam Son 719. A 2 April article by Chien Binh departed from the usual Hanoi pattern of vaguely stating that victory was certain, arguing instead that the communists were fully able to defeat the allies "militarily."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 18 -

## CHINA

## PEKING PROPOUNDS "REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC LINE" ON ARMY DAY

Peking has used the occasion of the 44th PLA anniversary to propound its "revolutionary diplomatic line," in effect justifying the kinds of demarche that have produced invitations to President Nixon and Burma's Ne Win--both formerly reviled as "fascist" and anti-Chinese--to visit the PRC. At the same time, Peking has sought to reaffirm its commitments to anti-U.S. forces and has called for U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan and other areas in Asia. In the wake of the PLA anniversary comment, containing Peking's most comprehensive statement of foreign policy since the announcement on President Nixon's visit, Peking on 4 August reacted sharply to Secretary Rogers' statement on the China representation question in the United Nations by accusing the United States of playing a "clumsy 'two Chinas' trick."

Peking marked the PLA anniversary with the usual reception, held on 31 July and addressed by Chief of Staff Huang Yung-cheng, and a 1 August joint editorial in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY. Peking's dual approach to revolution and diplomacy was illustrated by the honored status of a leader of the Burmese communist insurgents at the reception held on the same day NCNA announced the invitation to Ne Win. In addition to the Burmese communist, Ba Thein Tin, the guests of honor included the premier of Sihanouk's government, Penn Nouth; Le Duc Tho, stopping over in Peking en route home from the Paris talks; and diplomatic representatives from Peking's allies plus the Palestine Liberation Organization representative. As is customary for gatherings of this sort, NCNA noted the presence of the head of the Soviet delegation to the border talks.

**DIPLOMATIC LINE** As in other pronouncements during the period of Peking's diplomatic drive beginning last fall, comment on the PLA anniversary has celebrated the PRC's broadening international relations. The joint editorial confers the highest sanction on this development by describing the "great victories" achieved by "Mao's revolutionary diplomatic line," a formulation contrived to clothe Peking's pronounced shift toward diplomatic approaches with Maoist revolutionary rhetoric. The editorial refers to closer ties with unnamed communist countries and to growing relations with third-world countries. It also takes note of the intensive practice of people's diplomacy, singling out contacts with

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 19 -

the American people for special mention. According to the editorial, the continuing expansion of the PRC's diplomatic relations demonstrates that the U.S. policy of "blockading and isolating China has failed completely."

There was no mention in anniversary comment of President Nixon's forthcoming visit, a subject on which Peking has been silent since it carried the original announcement.\* But the editorial's exposition of Peking's "revolutionary diplomatic line," taken together with its portrayal of the United States "now declining just as the star of the British Empire did," provides a rationale for the demarche. Though there is no direct reference to negotiations in expounding the diplomatic line, the editorial contains an allusion to basic Maoist scripture on the subject in its call in this context for study of "the historical experience of our party in carrying out tit-for-tat struggles" against the enemy.

A recent source for such a study, the 1 July joint editorial article on the CCP's 50th anniversary, quoted Mao as having explained that "sometimes not going to negotiations was tit for tat, and sometimes going to negotiations was also tit for tat." This passage, from Mao's 1945 report "On the Chungking Negotiations," was cited in the 1 July article's discussion of Mao's trip to Chungking for negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek.\*\* The 1 August editorial, while treading gingerly along the delicate subject of President Nixon's visit, has thus subtly made use of a scriptural fragment and a significant formulation in a highly charged context to signal a policy line implying a major role for negotiations.

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\* Apart from the announcement, the only mention of the invitation to the President in PRC media was contained in Sihanouk's 24th message to the Khmer people, transmitted by NCNA on 2 August. A 3 August PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article pegged to Sihanouk's message carefully avoided any mention of the invitation. See the Indochina section of this TRENDS.

\*\* Mao's 1945 report was invoked to justify negotiating with the enemy in comment broadcast by the Kiangsu provincial radio shortly before the opening of the Sino-Soviet border talks in October 1969. This line was not picked up in the central media and was not heard in other provincial media.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 20 -

TAIWAN        While preparing the ground for negotiations, Peking has also staked out a tough position on the Taiwan question. Expressing concern over efforts within the international community to seek an accommodation on this question falling short of the PRC's demands, the editorial reiterates opposition to versions of a two-Chinas solution, the Taiwan independence movement, and the proposition that sovereignty over Taiwan remains unsettled. Both the editorial and Huang Yung-sheng's speech renew the call for withdrawal of U.S. military forces and installations from Taiwan and the Straits, one of Peking's long-standing conditions (along with an agreement on peaceful coexistence) for Sino-U.S. detente. The editorial and the speech are particularly notable for their pitch to the people on Taiwan to hitch their wagon to the PRC as the vehicle and focus of Chinese patriotism rather than to calculate on the advantages of independence of mainland authority. As the editorial puts it, "We are confident that our patriotic compatriots in Taiwan will not allow any foreign forces of aggression to sever Taiwan from the rest of the territory of China."

Last year on this occasion Peking limited itself to pro forma expressions of resolve to "liberate" Taiwan and a generalized demand for "U.S. imperialism" to "get out" of Taiwan. Huang last year mentioned the army as well as the people as being determined to liberate Taiwan; this year, perhaps less provocatively, he did not mention the army, declaring simply, "We are determined to liberate Taiwan." Both the editorial and Huang's speech this year contain the assertion that this matter "is China's internal affair and brooks no foreign interference," a standard line consistent with Peking's position since the 1950's that the U.S. presence is a subject for negotiations but that control over Taiwan is an internal question.

On 4 August Peking responded to Secretary Rogers' statement two days earlier that the United States will support the seating of the PRC in the United Nations while opposing expulsion of the ROC. A report carried by NCNA and the Peking radio treated the U.S. move as an effort to implement a two-China's policy that "is absolutely illegal and futile." The report expressed concern over indications that the United States will seek to have the question of the ROC's expulsion handled as an important question requiring a two-thirds majority. It did not mention the question of the Security Council seat, though it twice referred to China's "seats" in the United Nations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 21 -

Peking's prompt reaction to the Rogers statement suggests its concern to keep up pressures on UN members to meet its demands and to avert a two-Chinas arrangement. As in Peking's report on the China representation vote last fall, the 4 August report noted that the pro-PRC resolution won a majority vote "amid thunderous applause," adding that this year's resolution has won "warm approval and support from more countries." The report concluded with an expression of hope that "the justice-upholding countries" will not permit obstruction of the PRC's entry. The report failed, however, to specify what position the PRC would take should it be invited to join without the ROC's expulsion.

The report pointedly took note of the Secretary's statement that the decision taken "is fully in accord with President Nixon's desire to normalize relations" with the PRC. According to Peking, this "fully lays bare the counterrevolutionary double-dealing tricks of U.S. imperialism which says one thing and does another." The report did not, however, go on to draw implications from the decision for Sino-U.S. relations. Moreover, the report's vague attribution of plots and tricks to "U.S. imperialism" contrasts with Peking's reaction to an earlier move which it interpreted as aimed at a two-Chinas approach--State Department spokesman Bray's 28 April remarks terming sovereignty over Taiwan an unsettled question. A 4 March NCNA report on Bray's remarks repeatedly mentioned the Nixon Administration by name in ~~defining~~ its gestures to improve relations and warning the Administration not to "cling to its hostility" toward the Chinese.

PROLETARIAN  
INTERNATIONALISM

The PLA anniversary editorial sought to balance its exposition of Peking's diplomatic line with assurances that the Chinese remain faithful to their revolutionary commitments. Peking's foreign policy as outlined in the editorial follows standard lines: relations with communist countries on the basis of proletarian internationalism; support for revolutionary struggles; and peaceful coexistence with countries having different social systems. A week earlier, speaking at a banquet for a visiting Sierra Leone delegation, Li Hsien-nien prefaced a statement of support for the anti-U.S. forces in Indochina by hailing proletarian internationalism as "the highest principle guiding China's foreign policy."

A passage in the editorial pledging support for revolutionary and anti-U.S. forces opens with the avowal that "whoever opposes imperialism or makes revolution has our support." Complementing its demand for U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan, the editorial also includes demands for

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TREND

4 AUGUST 1971

- 22 -

withdrawal of American forces from Indochina, South Korea, and Japan. In Huang's speech the list was extended to include the Philippines and Thailand.

SOVIET UNION      The editorial gets in the usual thrust at the superpowers, naming the United States and the Soviet Union, and it updates a notion from the early 1960's in charging that the two superpowers seek to extend their power into "the vast intermediate zone." The editorial gives short shrift to "social imperialism," omitting to mention the Soviets by name in this context while denouncing the doctrines of limited sovereignty and the socialist community. Last year's editorial had made pointed charges about Soviet troop deployments along the Chinese border and portrayed a threat from the Soviets. The change in mood is reflected in the difference in the titles of the anniversary editorials, last year's "Heighten Vigilance, Defend the Motherland" now giving way to a vacuous "Commemorate 1 August, Army Day."

CONFIDENTIAL

4 AUGUST 1971

- 23 -

## EDITORIAL SEEMS TO DOWNGRADE LIN WHILE STRESSING CCP CONTROL

The joint editorial seems to diminish somewhat the status of Mao and Lin vis-a-vis the PLA, especially that of Lin as the leader currently in control of the PLA. Along with other Army Day articles and speeches the editorial speaks of the PLA as a force "founded and led" by Mao and "commanded" by Lin; previously, since 1967, the general practice has been to refer to the PLA as "personally founded and led" by Mao and "directly commanded" by Lin. Also, the toasts proclaimed by Huang Yung-sheng at the reception banquet refer to Mao as "great leader" rather than "supreme commander" and drop Lin's title of "deputy supreme commander."

In addition, the editorial depersonalizes the control of the army by noting that the army places itself "under the party's absolute leadership, going where the party directs," though it is still "acting as Chairman Mao teaches." And the army "identifies its responsibility to the people with its responsibility to the leading organs of the party."

Officially, Lin's direct control over the military seems to be unchanged with Army Day messages still referring to him as Minister of National Defense. The new format may merely reflect a felt need to downplay Lin's military role somewhat so as not to call into question the dictum, "the party commands the gun," should he accede to the party chairmanship. The editorial does seem to go further in this direction than strictly necessary, however. For the first time since the cultural revolution began, the Army Day editorial contains no quotation from Lin which all should heed, not even his injunction to study Mao. And in an unusual remark, bordering on a warning to anyone trying to force a policy against the army's collective will, the editorial observes that the army "has maintained remarkable unity in its own ranks as well as with those outside its ranks."

At the same time, in a marked departure from previous practice, the editorial stresses that the PLA must be firmly under party control. For the first time on Army Day since 1967, when radical leaders with power over the media used separate editorials in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY to urge closer control over the military, the editorial this year noted Mao's statement that "the party commands the gun, and the gun must never

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4 AUGUST 1971

- 24 -

be allowed to command the party." The PLA is referred to as "a powerful weapon of the CCP and the Chinese people," invincible only because it is "boundlessly loyal to the party, the people, the great leader Chairman Mao, and his proletarian revolutionary line."

The theme of party control over the army, which 's intermittently brought to notice in Chinese propaganda, had not been raised in recent Army Day editorials. The re-emergence of the theme in the editorial this year may reflect the fact of the formation of provincial party organs to which local units should look for party control. Since most party committees are headed by military leaders, much of the possible opposition to a reassertion of party control would probably be neutralized.

Probably, however, the reassertion of party authority is a reflection of a more general campaign for ideological rectification aimed at remnants of the 16 May group; although a "radical" group, it has been closely tied by Peking to elements in the army including deposed acting chief of staff Yang Cheng-wu. The fallibility of the army when not led by party leadership imbued with Mao's thought was the major thesis of an NCNA article on 31 July which reviewed the history of the PLA with emphasis on the line that "whenever Chairman Mao's revolutionary line is interfered with, the army suffers losses."

This article contains reminiscences by an old soldier recalling deviations from both the left and the right which resulted in disasters. It outlines Mao's specific actions for instituting party control over the PLA, with party branches and committees at all levels, carrying the system up to "the whole army" which was placed "under the unified leadership of the front committee of the party." The article does not specify that the civilian party apparatus exercised power over the military at any level below the central apparatus, possibly an indication that the current campaign for greater party control refers to the role of the party vis-a-vis the army in strengthening ideological controls rather than to the assumption of control over the military by local civil party organs.

#### POLITBURO MEMBERS PRESENT AT RECEPTION LISTED BY RANK

Eleven full Politburo members, headed by Chou En-lai, attended the Peking Army Day reception addressed by Huang Yung-sheng. Last year the comparable reception was attended by the same 11 leaders,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 25 -

plus Standing Committee members Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng, and PRC Vice Chairman Tung Pi-wu. Lin Piao has not appeared at the annual Army Day reception since before the start of the cultural revolution.

On this occasion, for the first time since the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, the leaders present for a major holiday turnout were listed according to Politburo rank rather than stroke order (Chinese equivalent of alphabetical order). There have previously been partial leadership turnouts in which the names were listed in non-stroke order, but the nature of the occasion -- government, cultural, or whatever -- obviated any strictly hierarchical listing.

Now the Army Day rankings confirm that Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, ranks above PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng. In 1970 there had been some variation in their listings; earlier this year, when they both appeared, Chiang had always been listed first, but these occasions were mostly of a cultural nature. Her senior party position now seems to be confirmed by the fact that she is listed, on Army Day, ahead of Huang.

Chu Te is the only Politburo member to be making his initial appearance under non-stroke-order conditions. Although the aged military leader probably retains little effective power, he does hold on to a middle Politburo ranking, above several active members.

Among secondary leaders attending the reception was Teng Hai-ching, former head of the revolutionary committee in Inner Mongolia. He is the first deposed provincial chief to surface in the official media--and after he had made no public appearances since October 1969. Teng was listed among other PLA leaders in a group that included officers from the Peking Military Region, of which he was formerly a deputy commander. He is ranked following all other full Central Committee members in the group.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIU TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 26 -

## SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS

## BLOC LEADERS, MINUS CEAUSESCU, STRESS UNITY AT CRIMEA MEETING

Moscow's concern to present a united front with its allies in the face of the developing Peking-Washington rapprochement and the recent events in the Middle East is registered in the communique on the 2 August meeting of "several" Soviet bloc first secretaries "vacationing" in the Crimea after the CEMA Council session of 27-29 July. The 2 August communique also reflects mounting Soviet concern over Romania's continuing resistance to coordination of its foreign policy with its Warsaw Pact allies. Romania's Ceausescu was the conspicuous sole absentee in the Crimea, in the wake of the CEMA session in Bucharest where the Romanians apparently succeeded in watering down the Soviet Union's plans for economic "integration" as one facet of its drive to cement bloc unity.

The communique on the Crimea meeting emphasizes the "mounting importance" of "cooperation" among the socialist countries "on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism"--code words for loyalty to Moscow. Arguing the need for communist unity in the context of the class struggle, the document reaffirms the "correctness" of the stand of the Moscow international party conference of June 1969 on the continuing need to combat "rightwing and leftwing opportunism" and to rally "all progressive and national liberation forces in the anti-imperialist struggle."

The party chiefs, according to the communique, "touched on topical questions of the development of the world communist movement as well as foreign policy problems of mutual interest." Following statements of Soviet positions on European problems, Indochina, and the Middle East,\* it says the meeting passed in "a cordial, friendly atmosphere and was marked by complete unanimity and mutual understanding on all the questions considered." In addition to Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Shelest, the Soviet delegation included Katushev and Ponomarev, CPSU secretaries in charge of ruling and nonruling international party affairs, respectively.

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\* See also the Indochina and Sudan sections of this TRENDS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FOUO TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 27 -

**FOLLOWUP COMMENT** In followup comment, Soviet bloc media have played the theme of the need for unity at a time when the "imperialists" are trying to exploit differences in the international communist movement. The prominence of the issue of relations with China in the Crimea deliberations was pointed up in a talk broadcast by Radio Prague in Czech and Slovak to citizens abroad on the 3d. Stressing the "political significance" of the Crimea meeting in view of the "hectic pace of political events" internationally, the commentator remarked that "Washington is evolving a detailed concept of how to exploit a new factor in international relations: the activity of the People's Republic of China with regard to the United States." It added that this policy "has the evident intention to weaken the positions of the Soviet Union" and the socialist countries' peace offensive.

ADN's report of a 4 August NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial on the Crimea meeting begins and ends on a note of the urgency of communist unity. It says "the meeting again proves that unity and its further consolidation are the determining factor in the community of socialist states," adding here that the GDR is "a firm and unshakable part of this community." After reviewing the subjects discussed at the meeting, it stresses that "unity in the broadest sense is needed" to solve these tasks.

A 4 August RUDE PRAVO editorial on the meeting, citing "differences in views in the international communist movement," says "world imperialism . . . is attempting to misuse various revisionistic trends, Trotskyism, and anarchistic tendencies" to dilute socialism's world influence and weaken communist unity. It adds that "events of recent weeks" indicate that the imperialists are "attempting to misuse anti-Sovietism, covering up their antisocialist aims with leftwing cliches," which it says demonstrate the need for struggle against right and left opportunism to strengthen unity.

**ROMANIAN BEHAVIOR** The Bucharest SCINTEIA reported briefly on 3 August that the Crimea meeting was held, listing the participants and noting that the East European leaders were "now vacationing in the Soviet Union." On the substance of the talks, it said only that the participants "informed one another on the progress of socialist and communist construction in their countries and broached topical questions on the international situation in the communist movement."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

PBBB TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 28 -

Also on 3 August, the Romanians used the forum of the Geneva disarmament talks to reiterate their views on the need for regional disarmament measures in the Balkans and more broadly-- according to AGERPRES' account of remarks at the session by Romanian Ambassador Ion Datchu--for withdrawal of foreign troops to their own national boundaries, for concomitant abolition of military blocs, and for all countries to "refrain from any act generating tension." On the same day, TASS and MTI announced the start of Warsaw Pact "tactical cooperation maneuvers" code-named Opal 71 involving Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian troops under the direction of the Hungarian Defense Ministry, presumably taking place chiefly on the territory of Romania's northwest neighbor.

#### CEMA COMMUNIQUE REFLECTS PRICE OF "UNANIMITY" ON INTEGRATION

Released in the media of the CEMA member countries on 29 July, the communique on the 25th CEMA Council session emerges as a patchwork document reflecting the compromises necessary to achieve "unanimity" on the 15-20 year "complex program" for phased economic integration. Hungarian Premier Fock, in an MTI interview after his return home, stated that the program had not been "adopted smoothly" and that there were "serious debates." The communique, phrased in such a way as to accommodate the varying and conflicting views of the implications and acceptable bounds of "integration," contains ingredients that have enabled each of the participants to express satisfaction in subsequent comment--and in the process to bring the differences and crosscurrents into sharper relief.

Treating the new program in broad general terms, in advance of its publication in full in the press "in the ensuing days," the communique is at pains to emphasize that the program "has been endorsed unanimously." It underscores in another passage the formal commitment secured from all the participants: They "reasserted unanimously that their countries are absolutely willing to undertake every organizational, economic, and juridical measure that is necessary to ensure an efficient fulfillment of the complex program." It asserts that the 24th CEMA Council session in Warsaw in May 1970 had also "unanimously" endorsed the integration program in its earlier developmental stage, although the 14 May 1970 communique had merely said that the gathering "discussed" the CEMA Executive Committee's report on the progress of work on the program.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 29 -

Passages regarding the price of "unanimity" emphasize that economic cooperation under CEMA is between "equal and sovereign" socialist states and, along with "socialist internationalism," embodies "respect for state sovereignty, independence and national interests, noninterference in the internal affairs of the countries, fully equal rights and free consent, mutual advantage and comradely reciprocal assistance." This recitation of the litany of tenets cherished by the Romanians is followed by a direct response to one of their vocal objections: an assurance that socialist "integration" does not imply the creation of "supranational bodies," specifically welcomed in Romania's post-session comment expressing general satisfaction with the document.

The communique records without elaboration a formalization of the coordination of national economic plans in the form of a new CEMA "committee for cooperation in the domain of planning." While Romania's post-session appraisal in SCINTEIA emphasizes that the new program is based on free consent and entails no infringement on national self-management, a PAP interview with Polish Deputy Premier Jagielski on 30 July, a RUDE PRAVO interview with Czechoslovak Premier Strougal on the 31st, and a RUDE PRAVO commentary on 3 August all make the point that "joint planning" of certain economic processes will be a part of the integration program. Prior to the Bucharest session, Radio Moscow on 22 July had resurfaced the concept of future "international planning organs" and a single "joint" economic plan as an eventual outgrowth of the coordination of national plans.\* And Radio Sofia did its Soviet mentor one better in evoking on the 30th Lenin's grandiose vision of a future "world communist economy" governed by "a previously coordinated plan."

#### HARDCORE ALLIES PICTURE CEMA AS INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL UNITY

The broad political context in which Moscow views CEMA integration is indicated in the CEMA Council communique in the statement, echoed in the communique on the Crimea meeting, that the new program "will consolidate still more the political unity and cohesion of the fraternal socialist countries." And in post-session comment Czechoslovak, Polish, East German, and Bulgarian media have seconded Moscow's portrayal of CEMA in the perspective of all-round efforts to cement Soviet bloc unity and strength

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\* See the 28 July TRENDS, page 38.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 30 -

PRAVDA's 3 August editorial on the CEMA session said the new program will not only increase production but will "strengthen the defense potential of the socialist community." GDR Premier Stoph declared in an East Berlin radio interview on 29 July that the program will strengthen the political unity and cohesion of the socialist community in the struggle between the two major world systems. The CSSR's Strougal said in his 31 July RUDE PRAVO interview that the program will have a positive effect "in the broader political context" and contribute to "deepening unified procedure in the other fields of activity" of the parties and states.

Bulgarian Premier Todorov, replying to a toast by Ceausescu at a luncheon after the close of the CEMA session, pointed to the new program's "great political and ideological" as well as economic importance; and Radio Sofia on 30 July said it "creates the prerequisites for the further strengthening of our economic cooperation, for increasing the might of the socialist community, or, in other words, for strengthening the might of the progressive and revolutionary forces which determine the development of the world revolutionary process."

The speech at the CEMA session by Polish Premier Jaroszewicz, published first in summary form in TRYBUNA LUDU on 29 July and then in full on 1 August, characterized the integration program as strengthening "the ideological, political, and defensive unity of the CEMA countries" and coupled transparent admonitions to the Romanians on the importance of unity with reminders of the effective support and help the CEMA countries receive from the Soviet Union. Stating that "the Polish communists and patriots take the view that the Soviet Union is the mainstay of the historic opportunity for socialist construction and for success in the world," Jaroszewicz added pointedly that "this is how the communists and patriots of all CEMA countries think and feel." He declared that CEMA countries and their parties should "oppose in a principled way" all attempts to weaken unity. He went on to stress that "the internationalist unity of the countries of CEMA and the Warsaw Pact is one of the basic factors in the struggle against revisionism, nationalism, and dogmatism," adding that "any lack of comprehension regarding this duty damages our joint interests."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI/TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 31 -

### HUNGARIAN PREMIER STRESSES CONTINUING CONTACTS WITH WEST

Where Moscow's other allies played up the concept of economic integration as one inseparable facet of a comprehensive unity centered in Moscow, Hungary kept its discussion of the CEMA program largely in the economic context and betrayed special concern to present the program as no deterrence to an expansion of economic ties to the West.

This concern came through most clearly in MTI's interview with Premier Fock on his return to Budapest on the 29th. Fock said the new program "does not mean any change whatsoever" in Hungarian relations with countries "not participating in integration." He added that "we want to continue to trade with all countries" on the basis of mutual advantage and that the program "does not mean that we isolate ourselves," but rather "encourages us to create stronger contacts, while concentrating our forces, with countries which are outside the integration." Fock's remarks on this score amplified the statement in the Bucharest communique to the effect that "any country outside CEMA membership may take part totally or partially" in carrying out the program and that the CEMA countries would "continue expanding economic and technico-scientific links with the developing countries and with the developed capitalist states," on the basis of peaceful coexistence, equal rights, and respect for sovereignty.

Fock also said the integration program "takes far-reaching account of the principle of individual interest"--cases in which "all CEMA countries do not participate" in certain "partial measures." He added that "the fact that one or two countries do not participate in a certain action cannot be an obstacle to the cooperation of the other interested countries."

### ROMANIA INSISTS CEMA INTEGRATION WILL NOT AFFECT SOVEREIGNTY

Bucharest followed its customary pattern of treatment of major bloc events in which it participates, publishing the CEMA communique in all the Romanian dailies on 30 July and following up with its own interpretation in an authoritative article in SCINTEIA on 1 August. Reflecting apparent satisfaction at the outcome of the session, the article, by I. Fintinaru, hailed the new CEMA program as "a good start" and assured the Romanian people and foreign friends that the further movement toward bloc integration will not infringe on Romanian sovereignty.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 32 -

The SCINTEIA article, as reviewed by AGERPRES on 1 August, made clear that it was only the spirit of compromise and understanding at the CEMA meeting that enabled the Romanians to endorse the program document. It cautioned that now "the manner in which the concrete provisions are materialized becomes essential." As if to drive home this point, it added: "The Romanian party and people express their conviction that the self-same constructive spirit, of mutual understanding and cooperation, which allowed for the unanimous endorsement of the program will become the permanent feature of the practical activity carried on for translating into life its provisions."

In passages calculated to reassure the Romanian people on the sensitive issue of "integration," a term Bucharest media have normally avoided, the article noted that integration has been "the object of multiple concerns" and discussions and explained the Romanian leadership's view "that socialist integration must be approached as distinct from the aim attached to it in capitalist relations [and by implication also in the Soviet Union] and that it does not mean infringement of national independence and sovereignty."

The article went on to explain that "by integration we mean a diversification and expansion of the forms of cooperation which, by observing the sovereign decisions of each party and government, should lead to faster development of their productive forces. . . ." In this sense, the article added, the complex CEMA program alluded to in the communique "clearly specifies that socialist integration proceeds on the basis of fully free consent and is not accompanied by the creation of supranational bodies, does not affect the questions of internal planning, of financial activity and economic self-management." Further emphasizing the voluntary nature of participation in CEMA projects, SCINTEIA went on to recall that the original CEMA charter stipulated that relations among the member countries would be based on "fully equal rights" and "free consent."

Stating that the CEMA program would be in the economic interests of all its members, the article used circuitous language apparently designed to counter the notion that it would imply political integration: "The multilateral cooperation between the socialist countries has not, and cannot have, other objective and basic meaning than the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 33 -

accelerated and economic growth, the material and spiritual advancement of the society of each socialist country taken separately . . . ." In this context the article repeated the stock Romanian argument that Bucharest lives up to its international socialist obligations mainly by building socialism in Romania.

In a passage apparently designed to reassure the Chinese that Romania's endorsement of the CEMA program document portends no change in Romania's neutralist posture in the Sino-Soviet dispute, SCINTEIA reaffirmed that in addition to expanding cooperation in CEMA, Romania will continue to pursue cooperation with "all other socialist countries, to act on all paths for making its own active contribution to overcoming difficulties, to strengthen the unity of all the socialist countries." The article also contained an assurance that Romania "will act to expand cooperation with all the countries of the world, irrespective of social system."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 34 -

## NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

## PRAVDA ANTICIPATES PRC REJECTION OF FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE BID

Soviet media have said nothing about an official Chinese response to the Soviet proposal for a five-power nuclear disarmament conference, in the absence so far of any Peking publicity for the PRC rejection which Western press reports say was delivered to the Soviet embassy on 30 July. But a PRAVDA review of world reactions to the proposal on 30 July anticipated an unfavorable Chinese response in noting Western press reports that Chou En-lai had indicated a negative attitude toward the idea in talks with U.S. newsmen--a belated allusion to the substance of Chou's comments to the journalists on 21 June, shortly after the Soviet proposal had been sent to Washington, Paris, London, and Peking and the day before it was released in Soviet media.

Peking, which has yet to publicly acknowledge the existence of the Soviet proposal, used the joint editorial marking the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) anniversary in PEOPLE'S DAILY, RED FLAG, and LIBERATION ARMY DAILY on 1 August to accuse the nuclear superpowers of hypocrisy in calling for disarmament: "Although U.S. imperialism and social-imperialism talk about disarmament every day, they are actually engaged in arms expansion all the time," and "while carrying on nuclear blackmail, they are actively preparing to fight large-scale conventional war."

The Polish news agency, PAP, in a Warsaw-dated review on 1 August of the PLA anniversary observance in Peking, noted that Chinese comment was full of "anti-Soviet invective" and in this context attributed to "Peking diplomatic circles" the report that "the Chinese government turned down" the Soviet bid for a meeting of the five nuclear powers.

PRAVDA ON CHOU'S JUNE COMMENTS      The 30 July PRAVDA article on world reactions to the Soviet proposal, by V. Demin, said the PRC "has stated that it will examine the proposal" but added that according to Western press reports "the PRC is not displaying interest" in it. Demin said the reports to this effect were based on "the talks between Chou En-lai and American journalists" during which Chou "expressed reservations with regard to convening a conference" of the five powers. TASS on 23 June had cited a New York TIMES report of Chou's comments

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 35 -

to the newsmen on the 21st, noting that he said he "would discuss" the Soviet proposal; but TASS did not at that time mention the TIMES' observation that Chou indicated reservations. The day after the Demin article appeared in PRAVDA, a Moscow broadcast in Mandarin said foreign press reports noted "recently" that the PRC "does not show much interest in the proposed conference of the five nuclear powers" and specified that the reports were based on Chou's comments to the newsmen on 21 June.

Demin's article contained a clear allusion to the PRC's own call for a world summit conference on nuclear disarmament, including both nuclear and non-nuclear countries, in reminding the unnamed advocates of such a forum that the Soviet Union "never has been and is not now against such a conference" and in recalling that the idea had been endorsed at the 24th CPSU Congress.\*

#### PRAVDA ON REACTIONS FROM WESTERN CAPITALS

Rounding up Western reactions to the bid for a five-power conference, the Demin article said France had "already expressed its positive attitude." He cited a U.S. State Department spokesman to the effect that the United States would study the proposal and would consult with its allies, adding that the United States had indicated at the Geneva disarmament talks that "there exist a number of problems which should be discussed precisely by the nuclear powers themselves"--a quotation from James Leonard, at the opening session of the Geneva talks on 29 June, which Moscow has cited before. As for the British, Demin said U.K. Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home had noted that London was studying the proposal and that the United Kingdom "will undoubtedly wish to be represented" at a five-power conference.

Demin went on to respond to arguments against the Soviet plan, including "pessimistic sentiments" and "lack of confidence" in its chances for success. He rejected the "strange logic" that the nuclear powers "are at different levels of development"

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\* See the TRENDS of 8 July 1971, page 22, for recent background on Peking propaganda pressing the long-standing PRC proposal for a world conference to discuss the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, with an agreement on non-use of the weapons to be reached as a first step.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 36 -

and that this would preclude the possibility of agreement. And he decried "groundless and irresponsible allegations" that the Soviet proposal is "aimed at creating difficulties for the other nuclear powers."

IMPACT ON SALT      Discounting Western speculation that a conference of nuclear powers "could supposedly create an obstacle to progress at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT)," Demin stated categorically that "a conference of the five cannot replace the bilateral talks that are already being held between the USSR and the United States" because "the questions on their agendas differ." While a five-power conference would discuss "a wide range of measures for nuclear disarmament, affecting all the nuclear powers," he said, "at the bilateral Soviet-American meetings the narrower issue of limiting the systems of strategic defensive and offensive weapons which the United States and the Soviet Union now possess is being examined."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 37 -

## S U D A N

## OBSERVER ARTICLE, TASS STATEMENT HIGHLIGHT PROTEST CAMPAIGN

Moscow's voluminous campaign protesting the "bloody terror" in Sudan and the execution of three leading Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) members gained momentum after the release of the 27 July TASS statement, with reports of protest meetings throughout the Soviet Union and statements by Soviet public organizations.\* Concurrently, TASS continues to carry terse reports stating that "reprisals continue" in Sudan, briefly noting further arrests and prison sentences and ministerial changes. The first press comment comes on the 30th in an "Observer" article published in both PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA which objected to "imperialist" allegations that the 19 July coup was directed from Moscow, and first raised the question of future Soviet-Sudanese relations. A second TASS statement, on 31 July, which revealed that the Soviet leaders had sent protests to Sudanese Chairman an-Numayri on the 25th and 26th, complained of "unfriendly acts" against Soviet representatives in Sudan, and went beyond the Observer article in asking whether the Sudanese leadership wished to maintain friendly relations or "push the matter to their curtailment and possibly disruption."

There is as yet no monitored reaction from Soviet or Bulgarian media to Khartoum's diplomatic moves: an-Numayri's 31 July ultimatum to the Soviet ambassador to end Soviet attacks on his regime within 48 hours, as reported in an interview with an-Numayri in the 1 August London OBSERVER; Omdurman radio's 1 August announcement that the Sudanese ambassador to the USSR and Bulgaria was being withdrawn; and the 2 August Omdurman announcement that the Bulgarian ambassador and the Soviet embassy counselor had been declared personae non gratae.\*\* According to a MIDDLE EAST NEWS

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\* Moscow's current propaganda campaign is reminiscent of its campaign in early 1963 against persecution of communists in Iraq which was highlighted by two CPSU Central Committee statements, editorial comment in PRAVDA, and reports of protest meetings. See the FBIS SURVEY OF COMMUNIST BLOC BROADCASTS, 21 February 1963, pp. 11-15, 7 March 1963, pp. 14-16, and 21 March 1963, pp. 15-16.

\*\* Sofia radio on the 3d does report Khartoum's recall of some Sudanese ambassadors from other posts, but not from Bulgaria. DPA is the only source of a report from Khartoum on the 3d that a spokesman of the Soviet embassy said the USSR had protested the expulsion of the Soviet counselor.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 38 -

AGENCY (MENA) report from Khartoum on the 3d, a Sudanese Foreign Ministry official said the two were expelled because they were in contact with the 19 July coup leaders. The official also reportedly said that the recall of the Sudanese ambassador "does not absolutely mean that we have requested or will request the Soviet Union to withdraw its ambassador."

OBSERVER ARTICLE,  
TASS STATEMENT

The PRAVDA-IZVESTIYA Observer article takes several tacks in approaching the Sudanese developments, suggesting concern that the SCP will be "completely liquidated" and that "anticommunist repression" may spread to other Arab countries, defending the history and role of the SCP, reacting somewhat defensively to "imperialist" allegations of Soviet collusion in the 19 July abortive coup, proclaiming Moscow's credentials as a supporter of the Arabs, and bringing up for the first time the question of the effect of the Sudan events on bilateral relations.

Observer proclaims strict Soviet observance of the policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of Arab states. But at the same time the article somewhat contradictorily states that the Soviet people are not indifferent to the destinies of the fighters against imperialism, and "no one should have any illusions in this respect." And Observer, broaching the question of state relations, finds it "strange, to say the least," that "certain Sudanese leaders" should declare that the reprisals against communists will not influence the close Soviet-Sudanese relations. These themes are replayed in followup propaganda.

The second TASS statement on Sudan in five days underscores throughout the views of "Soviet leading circles" while disclosing representations to an-Numayri on 25 and 26 July appealing for an end to harsh sentences on Sudanese "public leaders" and protesting "unfriendly actions" against Soviet representatives in Sudan. The Observer article had foreshadowed the revelation of the Soviet leaders' appeals in noting "numerous calls of the Soviet leaders" to the Sudanese authorities and, like the TASS statement, complaining that these appeals went unheeded.

According to the TASS statement, Podgorny's appeal against harsh sentences, in a message on the 25th, was followed by a statement by "the Soviet leaders" on the 26th conveyed through the Soviet ambassador in Khartoum, which "emphatically" appealed to an-Numayri not to resort to extreme measures and professed not to understand

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PDBS TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 39 -

the sentencing and execution "even of those who were not directly involved" in the 19 July events. TASS complains that these appeals went unheeded; Sudanese trade union leader Ahmad ash-Shaykh and SCP leaders Garang and Mahjub fell victim to the "bloody reign of terror," it says, adding that the CPSU and the Soviet people "angrily denounce" these "cruel measures." (Podgornyy's appeal preceded Ahmad ash-Shaykh's execution by one day; Garang and Mahjub were executed on the 27th and 28th.)

TASS conveys the impression that the second representation dealt primarily with bilateral relations, noting that the Soviet leaders' statement emphasized that the USSR "does not intend" to interfere in Sudanese internal affairs but that at the same time it called attention to "certain actions" of Sudanese authorities harming Soviet-Sudanese "good relations." They had in view, TASS reveals, "unfriendly actions against Soviet representatives in Sudan, damage to property, threats and acts of violence against Soviet officials in Khartoum." In light of such "provocative acts," TASS adds, the question naturally arises as to whether the Sudanese leadership is willing to maintain friendly relations or to push the matter to "their curtailment and possibly disruption." Maintaining and developing Soviet-Sudanese relations can only be accomplished if the leaderships of both countries work to this end, TASS declares.

While Observer claims that imperialist circles, wishing the anticommunist hysteria to take an anti-Soviet direction, assert that the "so-called 'movement of 19 July' was allegedly directed from Moscow," the TASS statement says that in Sudan "as beyond its borders there are forces"--unspecified--who would like to shift the responsibility "for some or other domestic events" onto the Soviet Union.

OTHER MOSCOW COMMENT      Still another elite statement--the communique on the 2 August meeting in Crimea of Soviet party and government leaders with party leaders from East Europe (except Romania) and Mongolia--expressed "grave alarm" in connection with the "ruthless terror" against the SCP and other democratic organizations in Sudan. Typifying Soviet and East European propaganda protests, the statement "strongly condemned" the "lawlessness and arbitrariness" of the Sudanese authorities which are "exploited by the forces of imperialism and reaction against the interests of the Sudanese people."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 40 -

Broadcast comment in Arabic has stressed this theme, charging imperialism and Israel with exploiting the Sudan events to split the Arab anti-imperialist front and drive a wedge between the Arabs and the Soviet Union. A broadcast in Arabic on the 3d pegged to the Crimea meeting stresses the socialist countries' past and present support of the Arab cause, pointedly noting that the Arabs realize what it means to have a dispute with the USSR, for without the strong support of the socialist countries against Israel "they would be compelled to resort to the colonialists."

Minimal attention to Assistant Secretary Sisco's current talks in Israel brings up Sudan along the same lines: A Volskiy domestic service commentary on the 3d, for example, charges Washington and Tel Aviv with trying to split the Arab front as well as impair Arab-Soviet relations. And he recalls the statement in the CPSU-Arab Socialist Union (ASU) communique on Pomarev's 20-30 July visit to Egypt on the dangers of anticommunism. This passage in the communique--clearly initiated by the Soviets in light of the Sudanese developments--says that anticommunism serves only the interests of imperialism and reaction, and it claims that attempts to spread anticommunism are aimed at splitting the ranks of the Arab fighters against imperialism, Zionism, and Israeli aggression.

REPORTS ON                Soviet media have extensively publicized  
ARAB REACTION           world-wide protests, primarily from foreign CPs  
                         and East European and international front  
organizations. But there is a noticeable dearth of reports on  
Arab reaction, Moscow selectively publicizing criticism from  
such predictable sources as the Arab CPs, Lebanese leftists, and  
some Arab trade unions. Staying clear of the Iraqi-Sudanese  
dispute in the wake of the 19 July events, Moscow apparently has  
failed to mention Baghdad assaults on an-Nuqatra.

The only criticism heard to emanate from the UAR--a statement by the executive council of the UAR General Federation of Workers, expressing "shock" at the "bloody incidents" and arrests of trade union leaders--was reported by the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY on 1 August and picked up by TASS the following day. (Cairo's domestic service interrupted its normal programming on the 2d for an announcement that "some foreign agencies" had reported a decision issued by the workers federation, and that President as-Sadat had ordered an immediate investigation. The announcement added that the UAR fully supports the Sudanese 25 May revolution and "rejects any form of interference in the domestic affairs of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 43. -

fraternal Sudan.") Moscow has naturally ignored favorable Libyan and Egyptian comment, such as AL-AHRAM's editorial on the 24th greeting the Sudanese people's "victory" and the return of an-Numayri, or Qadhafi's defense of the Khartoum executions in his 1 August press conference.

OTHER BLOC REACTION Soviet media have chastised Peking for its "eloquent silence" on the "bloody terror" in Sudan, TASS on the 30th noting that according to Omdurman radio an-Numayri had addressed a message to Mao expressing the conviction that Sudanese-PRC "excellent relations" would be further consolidated. A Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Mandarin on 28 July and a Moscow broadcast to Czechoslovakia on the 30th pointed out that the sole NCNA dispatch--on 26 July--said not a word about the persecution of communists. In a speech to the armed forces on 2 August, reported by Omdurman radio on the 3d, an-Numayri expressed appreciation for messages from "the friendly PRC, dear Korea," and other states.

The DPRK and Albania have apparently maintained silence on the Sudanese events, while pointedly issuing denunciations of Jordanian "provocations" against the Palestinian guerrillas--an Albanian women's union statement on 28 July and a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on 2 August. The other East Europeans, Mongolia, and the DRV have all protested in various fashions and at various levels. The Bulgarian and Romanian party central committees issued declarations and the Hungarian MTI carried an authorized statement. Bulgaria's Zhivkov, the GDR's Ulbricht, and Mongolia's Sambuu sent messages to an-Numayri, while a Tito envoy, Josip Djerdja, has had talks in Cairo and Khartoum.

#### COMMUNIST MEDIA VARY ON ROLE OF SUDAN CP IN 19 JULY COUP

Communist media, when referring at all to the 19 July abortive coup, have tended to deny SCP participation, North Vietnam alone mentioning SCP "active participation" and a Hungarian paper seemingly implying at least some party sympathy. Moscow's few references underline SCP noninvolvement, TASS even obscuring an acknowledgment by an SCP Politburo member that the party "supported" the movement.

Thus TASS on 2 August briefly reported Sudanese CP Politburo member 'Izz ad-Din Ali 'Amir as telling the French CP daily L'HUMANITE that the Sudanese CP did not take part in the 19 July events. But it did not include his additional remark, as published in L'HUMANITE

CONFIDENTIAL

4 AUGUST 1971

- 42 -

on the 2d, that the SCP supported the 19 July coup because its leaders promised to restore democratic freedoms and allow banned organizations to function, although the party, he said, has always been opposed to the military coup method. The secretary of the Sudanese CP's "section in Czechoslovakia"--interviewed on the Prague domestic service on 30 July--also affirmed that the "revolutionary changes" of 19 July were "welcomed by all democratic forces in our country and abroad." Asked about the party's prospects now, he said the SCP was "well experienced in underground work" and he thought strong enough to continue its activities.

A VNA report of a 30 July NHAN DAN editorial on the Sudan "massacre" is notable for the statement that the 19 July coup "was conducted with the active participation" of workers, peasants, progressive army officers, and "members of the SCP." Broadcast excerpts of the editorial in the domestic service and in English- and French-language services failed to include this statement, as did TASS' 30 July report on the editorial. The Hungarian MAGYAR NEMZET, in an article reviewed by MTI on the 28th, also seemed to hint at SCP involvement in ambiguously stating that the 19 July "putsch" was a consequence of an-Numayri's policy, "for the group of leftist officers executed in the meantime, the Sudanese Communist Party, and the mass organizations did not want to watch passively what was happening."

Other communist references to the initial coup, however, have disclaimed SCP involvement. A participant in the 1 August Moscow domestic service commentators' roundtable complained that the Sudanese leaders accused the SCP of being behind the 19 July "plotters, although the facts do not confirm this in the least." And TASS on the 28th reported the Paris FIGARO as commenting that it was doubtful that SCP Secretary General Mahjub took personal part in planning the "purely military coup." An East Berlin commentary on the same day cautiously observed that the background and causes of the 19 July coup were "still obscure," but the Polish ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI, according to PAP on the 29th, stressed that the architects of the abortive coup "were not communists at all." Similarly, French CP leader Marchais claimed in a speech reported in L'HUMANITE on the 29th that SCP head Mahjub had shown that the SCP "had never participated in any plot."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 43 -

L'UNITA, FRENCH CP  
ON HAYKAL, UAR PRESS

The Italian Communist Party organ L'UNITA promptly attacked Muhammad Haykal, editor of Cairo's AL-AHRAM, for his views on the

Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) expressed in a 30 July article. Haykal's assertion that the SCP "committed a 'historical error' by aiming at exclusive control of Sudan" is branded in a 31 July article by Jacoviello as not only one of Haykal's "flagrant lies" but a matter of infamy. Jacoviello maintained that the party's history demonstrates exactly the opposite of Haykal's "pseudothoretical disquisitions," but failed to reproduce his specific criticisms. He suggested that if Haykal wanted to present the truth he should publish--as L'UNITA did in the same issue--a February 1960 speech by SCP Secretary General Mahjub illustrating SCP policy "on the question of coups."

At the same time, Jacoviello criticized Haykal for refraining from any reproach of "Sudan's Tshombe," Chairman an-Numayri, but professed to understand his silence in that an-Numayri is considered "a precious ally" by "those in Egypt" who share Haykal's orientation--seemingly a slur on President as-Sadat himself. The article went on to dispute Haykal's statement that as-Sadat "supposedly intervened" with an-Numayri to try to save the life of the late trade union leader Ahmad ash-Shaykh. "We happen to know," Jacoviello said, that as-Sadat conveyed to an-Numayri a message by Podgorny "without adding anything of his own to that message."

Haykal noted that some European CPs "slipped into the pitfall" of supporting the 19 July movement and called this "unjustified ignorance." He anticipated an uproar over Ahmad ash-Shaykh's execution, and commiserated with the USSR on its unenviable situation: "It cannot interfere and it cannot remain silent" under pressure from trade union movements and the communist parties, especially in Western Europe.

Another swipe at the Egyptians came from French CP leader Georges Marchais in a speech at a PCF demonstration on Sudan, reported in the 29 July PCF organ L'HUMANITE. Rejecting any complicity with the Sudanese "executioners," Marchais said the PCF had denounced the "dishonorable attitude" of the Libyan leaders who had encouraged an-Numayri and had even delivered some victims into his hands. And the PCF, he said, found it "unforgivable" that "some Egyptian papers" published "forged documents" concerning the activities of Sudanese communists with a view to providing arguments for their murderers. (Cairo's Al-Akhbar

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 44 -

on the 27th published Mahjub's "confession" to an-Numayri before his trial.) Marchais added that on 27 July the PCF made its views known to "the ASU chairman in Cairo"--as-Sadat-- and asked him "finally to act" to prevent new crimes in Sudan.

In his L'HUMANITE interview, SCP leader 'Ali 'Amir claimed that an-Numayri would have been unable to regain power without "foreign intervention," which he claimed was decided during a conference in Tripoli, Libya, attended by unnamed Libyan leaders, UAR War Minister Sadiq, and Sudanese Treasury Minister Abd al-Halim. He charged that the Egyptian army radio was used by Sudanese Defense Minister Hasan Abbas in the operation to restore an-Numayri, and that Egyptian planes landed Sudanese troops which had been stationed at the Suez Canal.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 45 -

## GERMANY

## GDR DETAILS OFFER TO SENAT; TASS EDITS NEUES DEUTSCHLAND ITEM

Against the background of publicly acknowledged progress in the four-power negotiations on Berlin and Western press discussion of confidential documents from the negotiations, East Berlin's SED party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 31 July publicizes details of the GDR proposals made to the West Berlin Senat at the ongoing talks between GDR State Secretary Kohrt and Senat Director Mueller. The details of these proposals have not been discussed previously by East German media on their own authority except for a 13 March NEUES DEUTSCHLAND article that outlined the proposals through the device of quoting a West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL report.\* The 31 July editorial strongly criticizes the Springer and CDU/CSU press and other west German mass media -- especially the 28 July issue of the weekly QUICK -- for revealing confidential details of the quadripartite talks on "West Berlin."

Affirming that it is the GDR's desire to normalize relations "between West Berlin and the GDR," the editorial repeats the standard GDR call for success in the talks and noted that the GDR has submitted proposals to the West Berlin Senat. It immediately goes on to note that both sides "must show good will, and that includes recognition of the reality that West Berlin is a city with a specific political status and that it has never belonged to the Federal Republic and never will." A lengthy 1 August TASS summary of the editorial includes this comment.

Comparison of the details of the proposals as publicized in the March article with those in the current editorial indicates several changes. Where both articles noted there could be up to six visits of one- or two-day periods or once a year for up to 30 days for West Berliners to travel to "the GDR and its capital Berlin," the editorial adds that travelers will need a West Berlin identity paper and a GDR entry and exit visa. The March article,

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\* See the FBIS TRENDC of 17 March 1971, page 36.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
4 AUGUST 1971

- 46 -

In discussing the concessions due from West Berlin, cited 'TAGESSPIEGEL' to the effect that the Senat "would have to accept" the most important GDR demands: "The Berlin Senat would have to act like the government of an independent state"; it would also "have to recognize the affiliation of East Berlin with the GDR"; and it "should assume the obligation to prevent political activities in West Berlin which have scandalized the GDR for a long time." NEUES DEUTSCHLAND went on to note that the West Berlin paper interpreted the last condition to signify "the Federal presence" in West Berlin, an issue on which the Big Four were then "conducting negotiations."

Without explicitly listing any "conditions" the Senat must meet, the editorial now declares that the "West Berlin Senat would only have to guarantee orderly arrangements for the visitors' traffic and spare West Berlin unnecessary complications"--an apparent allusion to Federal Government activities in West Berlin.

The TASS report on the editorial furnishes no details of the GDR proposals to the Senat, but simply notes the editorial's claim that the GDR had made a "generous offer." With similar circumspection, TASS failed to summarize portions of the editorial which explained that the GDR had offered a treaty on regulating transit traffic between West Berlin and the FRG and which noted that "sealing of carriers transporting civilian goods is being considered"--a reference either to the FRG-GDR talks between State Secretaries Bahr and Kohl or to the Big Four talks. TASS also ignored the passage in the editorial pointing out that the problems of "enclaves such as Steinstuecken could be solved by a contractually arranged exchange of territory with the West Berlin Senat"--another topic within the mandate of the four-power negotiations.

**RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEAKS** On 3 August NEUES DEUTSCHLAND again denounced certain West German papers for publicizing out-of-context and distorted documents from the confidential negotiations. The article went on to charge that such documents could not have been made public "without the knowledge and the direct or indirect support of individual participants in the four-power negotiations." TASS reported this charge in its summary of the article.

The only original Moscow comment on publication of the documents in the West German press, in a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

4 AUGUST 1971

- 47 -

Germany on 31 July, claimed that CDU/CSU and "neonazi" supporters in FRG Government offices are responsible for the leaks.

Available Soviet and GDR media reports have not taken note of the detailed report in the 2 August New York TIMES on the present state of the four-power negotiations.

CONFIDENTIAL